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Introduction
On 25 September 1974, the South African Students* Organisation
and the Black People's Convention held two rallies to celebrate
independence in Mozambique. within two weeks, 29 black
consciousness leaders were in detention, as the state prepared
for a major trial of the black consciousness movement which would
see nine leaders of BFC and SASO facing conspiracy charges under
the terrorism act.l The state sought to put on trial the actions
and ideas of the movement since its foundation, in order to
portray it as a revolutionary movement led by self-conscious
conspirators. In the state * s view, the black consciousness
movement sought to go one stage further than the ANC or PAC had.
If they had failed, it was because they had reverted to
guerrilla movements without preparing the people for mass
revolution: it was this that black consciousness would build.2
The state thus charged the accused with a conspiracy to bring
about revolutionary change and/or the promotion of racial
hostility. A second count charged seven of them with organising
the rallies with intent to promote racial hostility. These two
counts were mutually reinforcing: the rallies were the
confrontational fruition of the conspiracy; the conspiracy
explained what the rallies were all about. The conspiracy was to
be found primarily in the rhetoric of the organisations, its
publications calling on even children to "talk, eat, live, cry
and play the struggle for liberation,"3 its language talking of
* infiltration. • 4 The conspiracy was to be inferred from the
"cumulative effects" of the actions and words of the groups, seen
"In conjunction with the nature and activities of the
organisations."5
The defendants, from the start, felt they had nothing to defend.
"We, the innocent," said Saths Cooper, "are being arraigned
before this court for the crimes perpetrated by the white
superstructure in this country."6 This, the biggest political
trial of the 1970s, is important from a number of perspectives.
First, it tells us much about the level of understanding of both
the state, and the white community, about the nature of black
protest organisation. As a trial of ideas, it reveals as much
about the self-identity of the state as about the organisations
being investigated. Second, it enables us to explore the
relationship of legality and prejudice in a political trial in a
situation where the representatives of one community seeks to
judge the values of another. As will be seen, the conspiracy for
which the nine were convicted was constructed in the mind of the
judge, its foundations resting solely on a partial view of the
world.
The Background to the Case: BPC and SASO, 1972-4
If the state saw BPC and SASO as large and well-organised
revolutionary forces, it was well wide of the mark, as is evident
from the early history of these groups. This will be seen in
three areas. Organisationally, both BPC and SASO suffered from
serious organisational difficulties in the period inder review.
In terms of ideology, their ideas were not confrontational,
lacking a clear strategy of political direction, but being
fnrnaaAd mna-t- AT* community worJc. Finally, they also suffered set-
backs at grass roots level in their community worx.
Though the ideas of black consciousness evolved slowly from the
late 1960s, it was from 1972 that the movement became more
organisationally active7 and more more assertive, both in
propagaging the ideology and becoming involved in community
issues. 8 However, by early 1974, both faced a number of
organisational problems. While SASO had mobilised much student
support in the university boycott which followed the expulsion of
OnXgopotse Tiro from Turfloop9 and in the UWC crisis in 1973,10
these crises also led to a backlash against the organisation on
several campuses, which weakened it.11 As SASO * s national
reputation grew, as a result of its ideology, campus branches
faced growing opposition. Local branches, such as those at
Haphumulo or on the Reef, faced problems raising funds and
maintaining an active membership.12 In 1974, the Western Cape
branch reported that active student involvement had "appallingly
decreased,11 a problem that found similar echoes in Durban.13 The
President's Report to the NEC in 1974 therefore concluded that
there was a tendency among SASO members to form exclusive
cliques, giving the impression that it was 'underground:* "This
deters potential SASO members terribly." Campus leaders were seen
to be too cautious, while the failure of the Head Office to
produce a regular Newsletter was seen to add to the damage.
Lekota concluded his report with the sobering thought that SASO
faced such large difficulties in 1974 as to threaten the very
existence of the organisation. "Both in terms of membership and
leadership,1* he concluded, "our resources have waned terribly."14
Similar problems dogged the BPC. At the time its first national
congress was held, in December 1972, at Hammanskraal, it was
still numerically weak. 15 BPC was relatively inactive for much of
1973, particularly after the banning of its leaders in
February.16 Throughout 1973, local BPC branches faced problems
of apathy. One report to the 1973 congress bemoaned the fact that
"People are so brainwashed and indoctrinated that they detest
anything that smells of politics." Similarly, there were
complaints that people were afraid to become involved, because
they "never know how, when, where one qualifies for a terrorist
or a communist."17 The local branch reports reflected small
scale, very localised action, rather than the high level
politicking that seemed to frighten off potential members. The
second annual conference in December.was therefore a much more
modest affair than was anticipated when BPC sent an invitation to
Leopold Senghor, president of Senegal, to address their
congress.18
If membership was small, BPC sought to give itself a hiaher
£££»«£. a^ ecoa&g ^ r i ^ H > °*idi if
struggles, most notably the* Chatsworth train b o y c " ^ ^ ^
1973 Durban strikes.20 BPC rhetoric was 3trSnI?°partici2ar£
after the bannings: "Black people must be aware that the dav of
reckoning with the racists is at hand," the organisation
?n C^ r G d^ "LOt--,P°^erL bo varne* tnat « » " wil!^e"r be
another Sharpeville but there could be another Vietnam [...]
Black majority rule will come willy-nilly."21 The high profile
was maintained with the Sharpeville commemoration in 1973: as a
result of speeches given here, Hokoape and Singh were prosecuted
in Durban, and fined.22 "We are prepared to have our blood
spilled," Mokoape had said, "just as much as the blood of our
brothers spilled at SHARPEVILLE, at LANG A, at BULHOEK, at
BONDELSWARTS and at countless other places in this country, in
the liberation movement."23
It was therefore their ideology, rather than their organisational
strength, that attracted attention. Nevertheless, their rhetoric
was not revolutionary, in the sense taken by the state.24 By and
large, they "spoke positively about ourselves and as little as
possible about anybody else except existing groups, you know,
like White society and its power structures."25 In essence, the
movement was not about protest, but about introspection. "The
primary form of expression for us," Adam Small wrote, "will be
the manifestation of our blackness time and again - and again,
whether Whites understand this or not will not be the point at
all. We are not there for Whites."26 Because of this, the key
forms of action were commemorations and the promotion of black
culture for black audiences. Political education would come
through a new understanding of history27 and culture.28 while
this historical vision could encourage action and be assertive,29
much of the history focussed on the blacks as victims.30 This
was also the case with their major political occasions, which
sought to commemmorate past outrages, via Days of Compassion or
Sharpeville copmmemorations. it is notable that even the Viva
Frelimo rallies were celebrating an external event. These
symbolic occasions were not particularly challenging, though in
some cases the language was confrontational. The _ rallies and
commemorations did not address the whites and their political
structure: and to that degree they were unfocussed. In large
part, symbolism was the cornerstone of black consciousness: its
very existence was its achievement.
Black self-assertion also entailed excluding theoretical
constructs used by radical whites to explain oppression. Indeed,
activists like strini Moodley argued that whites should follow
paths parallel to the blacks: "Introspection and redirection of
themselves are the only steps the "liberal1 can take."31 The
focus on psychological factors at the expense of theoretical
contructs however led to the problem that the movement lacked
specific goals, so that the precise vision of the future remained
indeterminate. The vagueness of BPC's ideals is exemplified by
the last clause of the membership pledge, vhere the member
undertook "to shoulder my task of making the world a worthwhile
place to live in." The ideology had a strategy, but no clear
goal32: since the philosophical constructs which interested the
ideologues of black consciousness were those concerned with
negritude and its psychology, the articulation of the ideas of
Black Consciousness tended to become increasingly abstract,
descending into a philosophical jargon which was almost
completely inaccessible,33 rather than leading to a working out
of a political programme.34 For that reason, much of the thinking
of the organisations on economic matters often seemed
contradictory or undeveloped.35 The ideologues rejected white
intellectual constructs of communism or socialism,36 turning
instead to a notion of communalism that owed much to Nyerere.37
This vision was based on a conjectural image of the nature and
history of tribal culture mixed in with applications to the
modern world: "in traditional black society, there was no such
thing as the rich and the poor.. .everybody was a worker."38 "The
Black man is an individual who 'belongs'; he does not exist in
isolation," noted a commission on Black communalism: "He says
'Yikithi laphaya* (that is our home) not 'that is my home.1"39 in
this spontaneous society, the chief function of the headman or
chief was merely to allocate collective resources in a fair and
even way. From this derived a concept of the state as guardian of
welfare and education, the initiator of industry. However, the
notion of the state remained unclear, the focus of attention
remaining with the individual: "every black man shall be his
brothers keeper indeed, and never a small boss and exploiter; but
[...] recognising our family bond and common obligations we shall
hold our hands in implicit co operation of a free and happy,
egalitarian society as an individual and common commitment.40
As with other facets of the philosophy, it therefore lacked a
focus. There could be no blueprint in this ideology for a future
society, beyond predictions as to how people would behave to each
other when once they behaved with goodwill. The ideology was
thus revolutionary, insofar as it involved a total rejection of
the current system,41 without clarifying the new. However, in
action, it was pragmatic and aimed at the poor black, at the mass
of uneducated and unenlightened people who stood most excluded
from white values. "Black Consciousness," the SASO Manifesto
announced, "will always be enhanced by the totality of
involvement of the oppressed people, hence the message of Black
Consciousness must be spread to reach all sections of the Black
Community. "42 The just and humane society would not be
predefined, but discovered through communities taking
responsibility for their own lives, by liberating the mind.43
Political emancipation came therefore less in mass campaigns than
in making people at the grassroots level take responsibility for
their own lives, by conscientizing' them. 44 Faced with "those
spiritual corpses who at this moment roam the streets of our
slums and ghettoes," and a youth "exiled to skollies and tsotsies
and thugs not because they chose it but because thev are
black,'M5 the task was to make people aware of theil ow£
situation and their potential.46 Conscientisation involved the
inculcation of a critical awareness by the individual of the
contradictions of his situation.47
This meant that the focus of the organisations would be
pragmatic. From the outside, the activities of those in BPC or
SASO may have seemed an intense form of political agitation: but
from the point of the community, they looked more modest: "if
anything," Mosioua Lekota said, "the only thing that people can
say about us is: those guys can really work, they build dams and
things like that."48 SASO's work involved spreading a political
message, but a message through example,49 assessing the needs of
a community, and helping its members isolate their problems and
put forward their own solutions. Politicisation came from
discussing local problems, not from preaching; so that
ultimately, the community would politicise itself. At the same
time, the community would solve its own problems and foster its
own sense of identity.SO "You are trying to tell the people the
values, good values of the community, so that one day they will
learn to perceive their situation, they will learn together with
the values that are good for any community," Nefolovhodwe said. 51
This gave a particular focus to several campaigns, notably the
literacy campaign,52 and a number of lesser educative schemes.
By 1972, SASO was committed to a full programme of community
development in a well co-ordinated manner.53 There was great
enthusiasm at branch level to begin such projects:54 Fedsem
students paid the fees for a student in Transkei for all of 1973
and also helped initiate a physical project at Kwa Mfenyana to
build a community hall.55 In the Eastern Cape, SASO members co-
operated with BPC members and other organisations to lay out
plots and clean a creche.56 Ngoye students set up an advisory
bureau for agriculture; and in a similar way, students helped
those communities facing forced removals, such as as Doornkop.57
However, problems dogged the community programmes, particularly
after the banning of the Black consciousness leaders in 1973,
seven of whom had been on the Literacy sub-committee.58 The
problems faced by SASO were particularly evident in one target
area, the winterveld Community Project, 40 kilometres northwest
of Pretoria, near Mabopane,59 an area chosen by SASO as a
community where all the key aspects of SASO's projects - health,
literacy and conscientization - could come together. Though the
project began enthusiastically, in each area there were
difficulties. The literacy instructors, university students
working in the community during their vacations, were untrained
as teachers, and could only stay for limited periods. The
reshuffle of teachers disrupted the teaching and hindered
progress. Similarly, the lack of proper facilities hampered the
project, the students often failing fully to publicise the
projects, being unable to arrange transport for the participants,
and then having to teach by candlelight. Finally, there was often
a poor response from SASO members, who supported the idea of the
project and who volunteered to assist, but who then failed to
turn up for the hard graft. The result vas that at Winterveld
only four pupils became functionally literate to a sufficient
degree as a result of the programme to think about assisting in
the education of their fellows.60
Similar problems were faced at Winterveld over health education.
Often, the problems faced were too large for the students to
solve. Advising on home cleanliness was a frustrating task given
the slum conditions, while incomes were so low that it was hard
to advise meaningfully on family budgeting. A conflict with the
sister in charge of the local maternity clinic did not help to
improve matters* Some progress was made: for example, in making
the local community more receptive to the idea of vaccinations.
However, the project was to be seen as a long-term one: "our
efforts will not necessarily bring about immediate change but are
geared toward them identifying their own problems."61 xet
the very limited assistance that SASO could give to a huge but
local problem, the long term outlook was not too good. Thus, by
the time of the fourth GSC in 1973, the project had run aground,
the only plans in sight being the opening of a soup kitchen
scheme* Yet by the time of the sixth GSC, nothing had been done
on this.62
Literacy projects continued to function in each area, albeit on a
small scale. The biggest problem they faced was apathy.63 Mosioua
Lekota told the organisation at Alice that many people who were
trained took the project no further, which rendered the project
useless. "I want to stress," he said, "that seminars and
formation schools are designed for a certain purpose and not
merely as a social gathering."64 Gradually, SASO began to
concentrate on two projects, at Dududu and New Farm, the former
the location of a building project, the latter in need of a water
supply. Despite the enthusiasm of those who set out to work
there, these projects also encountered problems from apathy.65 By
Hay 1974, the New Farm project had been abandoned, after an
unsuccessful approach had been made to the Phoenix Settlement
Trust, which refused to co-operate with SASO.66 In 1974, SASO's
attention turned to the plight of the Rooigrond community, which
was being forcibly resettled. Given the deprivation and
starvation that accompanied this, the fifth GSC resolved to raise
funds to set up a soup kitchen,67 but this project, like the
others, did not fulfil its intentions. In May 1974, then, Lekota
ruefully reported, "One only need look through past physical
projects reports to see how many of our projects
have been annulled."68 BPC had even less success with its
projects, which tended to have a more overt political focus:69
since BPC was still having problems raising funds, few projects
stood much chance of getting beyond the planning stage.7 0
In early 1974, both organisations seemed at a low ebb, in need of
action to revive themselves.71 The revival, however, was only
just beginning on the eve of the rallies. SASO1a main area of
revival was at Turfloop, where SASO supporters engineered the
resignation of the old SRC and the election of a new, SASO
dominated one.72 This region soon became active, holding both a
SASO week in September on the theme of 'Building the Nation for
the Struggle' second a regional Formation School was held,
attended by 80 students. This Formation School, held the weekend
before the rally, attracted the attention of the state for its
confrontational views, for much discussion seemed to focus on
armed struggle.73 Since the was a general talk-shop for
students, it told little about the organisation: what it showed
above all was the radicalism of the students on that campus and
the potential support for the type of rhetoric used by SASO.
Thus, at the time of the Turf loop rally, SASO was still
organisationally weak, but showing signs of gaining support.
BPC similarly sought a recruitment drive in 1974, seeking to use
the vehicle of mass rallies, where national council members could
address the meetings to help recruit.74 20 mass rallies were
planned for 1974, but in the event, none were organised before
the Durban rally. A newsletter was planned, entitled Inkululeko
Yesizwe, but this too took a long time getting off the ground,
and the first issue, which was eventually to come out in August,
and whose contents were drawn together, was never published.75
Nonetheless, the drive towards expansion was continued in
September, when BPC held what was called a ' Semi con' at
Hammanskraal, on "the inevitable liberation by seizure of
power," to be open to the general public.76 Later that month, a
symposium was held at the Kajee Hall in Durban, where the
speakers included Manas Buthelezi, Harri Singh, Nkomo, Zephania
Kothopeng and Gerald Phokojoe.77 At these events, the language of
BPC was becoming more aggressive, and the organisation was
beginning to recover from the blows it suffered in the 1973
bannings. However, even in September 1974, BPC was not yet a
strong national force, and was only beginning to organise more
events, and of these, the Viva Frelimo rallies were the most
important•
These rallies were perceived by the state as the key moment when
the organisations were to move from mobilisation to
confrontation. However, a glance at the background to the rallies
shows how ill organised they were. The very idea of holding
rallies to celebrate FRELIMO's victory was not raised until the
BPC symposium at Kajee Hall on 15-16 September 1974,78 and
initially there seemed little chance of getting it organised in
time.79 At Turfloop, where the SRC had taken a separate decision
for a rally, the organisation was similarly ad hoc.80 Here, the
bulk of the organisation of the rally was undertaken by SRC
members Ledwaba and Ratlagane,in the full knowledge of the
university authorities. There was thus a gap between the reality
of chaotic organisation and what seemed from the outside to be a
direct challenge to the state.
What attracted the most attention and caused most fear was the
rumour that FRELIMO speakers would attend the rally. On the
Saturday before the rally, the organisers, only just starting
their publicity,81 decided to try and arrange FRELIMO speakers,
and so Harri Singh, Nkwenkwe Nkomo and Haroon Aziz were sent to
Lourenco Marques to arrange it. The trip, in fact, was a fiasco,82
and they returned empty handed back on the morning of the rally.
In the meanwhile, however, the press had got to hear of the
coming of Frelimo speakers, thanks to a particularly
confrontational pamphlet issued by Kuntu Myeza. By Monday, the
papers carried stories that SASO were smuggling Frelimo speakers
into the country,83 something bound to inflame white opinion,
which perceived the new government of Mozambique as nothing more
than a set of terrorists.84 "South Africa has the right to insist
Frelimo does not preach revolution or become involved in
potentially inflammatory situations," the Johannesburg Star wrote
on the day before the rally, "which is what the ban on the SASO
meeting is all about." It was Frelimo, not SASO or BPC, that
caused the white panic, yet, as time passed by, it looked less
and less likely to the Durban organisers that any Frelimo
speakers would arrive.85 Myeza was hence unable to fill the press
in on who the speakers would be at the rally, but on Tuesday, The
World carried a report saying that a 8ASO spokesman in Durban had
claimed that four Frelimo leaders were already in South Africa.
Indeed, Myeza was at this point intentionally vague in his
dealings with the press, implying they were there.86 Rumour
fanned the flames of fear.
Thus, when one outraged citizen of Durban, Cornelius Koekemoer,
wired to the Minister of Justice, Jimmy Kruger,87 that "Thousands
of whites ready to take steps to prevent demonstration," Kruger
announced he would be banning all BFC and SASO meetings in a
Government Gazette to be issued the following day.88 However, the
organisers refused to believe it, leading them into a game of
bluff and counter bluff. At first, the organisers took legal
advice,89 which convinced them that the rally had not been
banned.90 It seemed as if the press, not the Minister, was
banning the meeting; and Myeza was aware that the credibility of
the organisation might be severely damaged if they cancelled a
rally that had not been banned. 91 For that reason, much rhetoric
was directed at the press. A joint BPC-SASO statement put out on
Tuesday night read, "We are not aware of any banning. We couldn't
care less if it is banned. We are going ahead at all costs with
all the rallies nationally. The People's will shall not be
suppressed by a foreign settler regime."92 Later, Myeza told Nat
Sarachi of the Rand Daily Mail that they were going to "bullshit
them** - "these fools, they cannot tell us what to do, man." Kyeza
was very assertive. "Shit, Nat, we*re going to have a, a very big
thing tomorrow," he said, "And of course it means I'll, I'll have
to go to gaol for a year or something like that." The principle
was clear, that if they were to retreat, they would lose face:
MUNTU: So we just taXe it to the final end.
NATS Ja, exactly.
MUNTU: Urn, to see what is, is, we want to see exactly, we
want to call their bluff, you see...They must come out clearly,
their true colours.
NAT: Ja.
MUNTU: We want to see them shooting us."93
However, by Wednesday morning, it became clear that the rally had
indeed been banned, and theorganisers were faced with the problem
of what to do with the people who turned up at Curries
Fountain.94 Initially, the leaders ought legal loopholes. Myeza
told Tom Manthata, a former vice President of SASO, that "If we
hold it and the people that address it do not belong to either
BPC or SASO and that's a very high thing to prove,...the onus of
proof is so high that these people cannot prove for instance
...that you have not resigned from SASO."95 Clearly, no one
envisaged the real possibility of dramatic confrontation at
Curries Fountain, for the plan was to have a full press
conference after the rally. Indeed, to some degree, they still
paradoxically saw the potential presence of Frelimo speakers as a
guarantee of safety, for the government had declared it was not
hostile to the new Mozambican government• 96 Ulitimately, the
organisers, after a stormy meeting at Mokoape*s room at the King
Edward Hospital, decided to play it by ear.97 If the rally was
cancelled, it would be because they wanted no confrontation, that
they suspected the authorities of planning another Sharpeville.
Mokoape's attitude was clear: "nobody must put themselves in a
position where they have to be the recipients of drastic
action."98
in the end, however, the rally turned out to be a non-event, for
the police charged the crowd just after Myeza•s arrival,
dispersing the crowd. Col. Jordaan had ordered the crowd to
disperse just before Myeza arrived to an enthusiastic welcome.
According to Myeza, and a number of eyewitnesses, he then sought
to lead a good-natured crowd away from Curries Fountain;
according to the police, there was an aggressive attempt to enter
the stadium.99 In any event, Myeza was at Curries Fountain for
less than five minutes, and the crowd dispersed quickly once the
police took action.
If in Durban, it was the anticipation of the rally that caused
the problem, at Turfloop, it was events subsequent to the rally
that caused alarm. On the morning of the rally, the campus was
covered with posters, some of which used extreme language*100
However, the mood on campus seemed normal, and the Rector, J. L.
Boshoff, decided to ignore them, saying, "I don't want to start a
war over placards."101 That morning, he was informed by the
police that SASO were planning an illegal rally at 2 pm, but
after checking with the students, and finding it was an SRC
rally, the Rector deemed it safe. 102 For the rest of the day,
the Rector played almost no part in controlling the situation-
indeed, at the time of the first clash with the police, he was
playing golf with the Registrar.103 Clearly, the university
authorities were not worried by the rally: indeed, according to
Nefolovhodwe, the Rector told them that the rally could go ahead,
provided there was no interference with morning lectures.104
However, when the meeting began, the police arrived, assuming it
must be a SASO meeting designed to inflame the relationship of
blacks and whites.105 The police ordered the meeting to disperse,
but when students gathered on the grass outside, they charged.
The students responded with throwing stones and thus the conflict
grew. The police claimed that the stones were thrown before the
police charge, yet it was clear that when they charged, the SRC
was trying to get the students to return to their hostels as well
as negotiating with the police. 106 In any event, the police were
fully prepared for trouble, having collected a force at Mangkoeng
police station drawn from as far afield as Messina and
Phalaborwa, and arming the white policemen with service
revolvers or shotguns, and their charge was swift and effective.
Three people were arrested, and others were injured. 107 The
situation seemed very inflamed, but after a discussion between
the SRC, the Black Staff Association, the Rector and the police,
the latter agreed to withdraw.108
By 3 pm, the trouble seemed over. However, not all the crowd
dispersed and when, later in the day, various white staff members
arrived on campus, they were attacked by students. C. C. straub,
lecturer in zoology, faced a large hostile crowd blocking his
path when he arrived at roughly 4.30, who smashed the window of
his car and who punched him through the window. Two other cars
were attacked at the same time, and one lecturer got a bad gash
on his face. The Turfloop conflict continued, reflecting campus
tensions as much as national ones. The day after the rally, the
Disciplinary Committee of the university met, at which the SRC
disclaimed responsibility for the violent posters, the graffitti
on the walls and the attacks on white staff. BASA passed a
resolution which denied that students had thrown stones at the
police, and laying the blame for the trouble on the police: "it
is our belief that the presence of the police on campus was, on
that occasion, and will always be provocative."109 BASA condemned
the action of the students who assaulted members of staff, but
noted that the SRC could not be held directly responsible for
their actions. BASA also criticised the white staff who "deemed
it necessary to intimidate students in lecture halls11 at the time
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that Black lecturers were trying to calm the situation, straub
was singled out for particular criticism, since he had insulted
and abused various members of staff. As a result of the black
votes, the Disciplinary Committee absolved the SRC from all
blame. On the 27 September, the university closed for a short
vacation, which was extended to the 15 October because of a
threatened student sit-in over the disciplinary issue, in the
meantime, however, arrests had been made - Nefolovhodwe on the
27th and Sedibe on the 11 October - and this escalated tensions.
On 15 October, 1000 students handed a petition in at the Mankoeng
police station demanding the release of the SRC President, and
threatening a sit-in; but as the petition was delivered, one of
the leaders of the march, Ramaphosa, the SASO local chairman, was
himself arrested under the Terrorism Act.110
The rallies must be put in perspective. Neither one, after all,
came fully to fruition, and such ugly scenes as there were were
caused by police attacks on the crowds. In themselves, the
rallies were unimportant: what they stood for was what most
alarmed white opinion. Ill The alarmist response was shared in
government circles, for not only were all the Black Consciousness
leaders arrested, but they even prosecuted a Durban newspaper
editor, J. H. W. O'Mally and his assistant for 'advertising1 the
illegal gathering in the Daily News. Despite the absurdity of
this prosecution, and widespread condemnation of it in the
English language press, the prosecution continued and a
conviction was obtained under the Riotous Assemblies Act in the
regional magistrates court, which was upheld in the Natal
Provincial Division.112
We have seen, therefore, that BPC and SASO were both relatively
weak in 1974, and that the rallies they staged were trivial. Yet
in the eyes of the state, the ideology was revolutionary, and the
rallies represented a trigger being pulled.113 We must turn now
to see how this conspiratorial vision was constructed in the mind
of the prosecution, and how it was secured by the court.
Constructing the Conspiracy
In the case, the state sought to secure its vision of BPC and
SASO as revolutionary conspiracies by using the testimony of two
key witnesses. The first was to be a view from the inside from a
!!»"fS52irat?J' the 5? c o n d an objective view from the outside by
an expert witness. It is these we must first examine to rive a
view of what the state thought the organisations were? 9
(i) Harri Singh
l*t JlJf!??*11 to * h ? . c a s e was tne concrete interpretation given to
the intentions behind the documents given by Harri Singh. Singh
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entered the witness box as an accomplice, the chairman of the BPC
Overport Branch since September 1972, and since August 1974 the
acting FRO of the organisation. He was a man with a pedigree in
politics, but also a man vho had suffered psychological problems
in the past.114
Singh13 attempted to show that there was a secret group within
BPC which aimed to turn the organisation towards mass
confrontation with the state, and which sought to recruit people
for military training* Singh argued that the masterplan had been
revealed by Hashwabada Kayathula on a drive from Durban to
Hammanskraal for the national council meeting in August 1974,
where he had apparently spoken of a three way phase programme for
the organisation. The first phase was the drive to get one
million members, the second phase was the conscientisation phase
and the third was the phase of violent confrontation* BPC, he
said, which had hitherto been wasting its time, now had to turn
to sending people out of the country for military training.115
This policy, Singh claimed, was evolved by a supreme command,
which consisted of Hayathula, Cooper and Mokoape.116 It had,
moreover, taken steps to recruit people for training.117
There was also a second public prong to confrontation, according
to Singh. Singh claimed that at the inaugural convention of the
BPC at Edendale in July 1972, various commissions looked at ways
to promote itself to encourage conflict. The economics
commission, he said, "reported on ways and means in which BPC
could use the Black worker to cripple the economy of the
country". The Planning Commission urged the organisation to build
up unions and make workers receptive to the confrontational ideas
of the BPC. After the initial three years period of raising
membership, BPC would launch a nationwide labour strike.118 The
confrontational policy was to come to fruition at Currries
Fountainll9. In this way, Singh wove together a cloth of the
secret aims, public policy and concrete actions of the two
organisations, which showed the organisations as being bent from
the outset on conflict leading to the violent overthrow of the
state. It was through the prism of secret intentions and hidden
conversations that all the ideas and literature of BPC had to be
interpreted. Revolution, which was implicit in the documents
before the court, could be made explicit via Singh*s
explanations.
Clearly, a great deal hinged on Singh1s credibility as a witness,
and his testimony was therefore heavily scrutinised. Ultimately,
much damage was done to his credibility. First, the notion of
the conspiracy to recruit military trainees was shown to be built
till!ErShfS2"i» a -as- S L S M M
for SLS£Sr£d-r O»M lamination, the discussions that Singh
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had told the police were BPC policy were admitted only to be the
Informal ruminations of certain individuals.121 Thus Buthelezi's
contention that the time would come to send people abroad for
training turned out to be the latter"s personal opinions. The
position was therefore less clear cut than he had initially
implied: there were no simple decisions of policy taken, nor were
these alleged changes In policy reflected in any actions. Singh
was similarly vague on Mayathula's role, admitting, for
instance, that the Reverend's language and propositions were
often extravagant and not always taken very seriously. Second,
Singh's version of events In the Kombi seemed highly suspect,
being plagued with inconsistencies. 122 Thirdly, Singh was unclear
on the precise status of the supreme command, for Singh said both
that it was the ultimate governing body, and that it was advisory
to the NEC and did not take decisions. 123 All that was clear was
that Cooper and Mokoape, the banned activists, were consulted for
advice and opinions on matters that came up, something that
should not really have seemed surprising given their role in the
movement. However, to prove the conspiracy, Singh attempted to
turn informal advice Into a formal supreme command which was to
plan the general strike. Finally, Singh seemed to be claiming
that BPC was at the same time planning a mass strike and
abandoning mass action in favour of military recruitment.124
Singh's evidence was also seriously weakened by the fact that his
interpretation of the nature of BPC as a revolutionary group was
based on his precise memory of detailed events in the past, yet
his memory was repeatedly flawed when he discussed details of BPC
politics that could be checked against the minutes of the
organisation.125 In themselves, these lapses of memory seem
trivial, yet given his precise claims about secret plots evolved
at these meetings (particularly at the inaugural Edendale
convention), they assumed greater significance. As David Soggot
suggested, it was highly suspicious that Singh1s memory seemed
crystal clear whenever there was hostility or violence involved,
but was very vague on other matters.126 This was true indeed:
Singh's evidence-in-chief and his comments to the police about
the Edendale meeting were confined to the issue of the
revolutionary strike, but omitted entirely the major theme of the
meeting, the philosophy of black consciousness.
In a number of other ways, Singh's evidence seemed improbable. As
one example, he claimed that when BFC took the decision to resort
to violence, he had been non-committal on it. 127 Singh both
claimed not to have made up his mind on the matter, and not to
have discussed it with anyone; 128 and to have decided himself to
go for military training, without discussing it with his wife and
with only casually mentioning it to Cooper.129 Momentous
decisions, even the most personal ones, were hence seemingly
treated as trivial: which they would have been if they were only
trivial flights of fancy. The sole evidence for a secret
conspiracy thus collapsed under scrutiny.
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(ii) Stoffel van der Merwe
If Singh provided 'inside* information, an 'objective' view of
the nature of BPC and SASO was to be provided by an expert
witness, Stoffel van der Merwe, Senior Lecturer in Politics at
RAU. Van der Merwe sought to establish a framework of theory
which would identify features of black consciousness ideology
likely to lead to revolution/ which could be used to measure the
revolutionary nature of BPC and SASO. However, his testimony was
similarly flawed, collapsing into an inarticulate expression of
white fears.
Van der Merwe began by outlining the necessary features of a
revolutionary group. The basic theory had four stages. (1) there
had to be a nucleus leadership group - a kerngroep. (2) It had to
have a binding ideology. (3) It had to seek to weaken support for
the established system, both internally and externally, and thus
to delegitimise the system. (4) It needed at the same time to
build support for the revolutionary idea, so that a stage could
be reached where the state could no longer withstand the
revolution. This needed organisational strength. Revolution thus
involved both the moral and physical undermining of the existing
system and the construction of an apparently viable
alternative. 130 Having set up this model, van der Merwe proceeded
to interpret the actions of BPC and SASO in light of this
view.131
The biggest claim in van der Merwe's argument was that his theory
had diagnostic value to predict and identify a revolutionary
group. This was the necessary crux of his evidence, insofar as
the black consciousness organisations had not engaged in any
recognizably revolutionary acts.132 However, it was a claim that
could not be sustained, for he had derived his model from a set
of secondary sources on revolutions none of which claimed that
prediction was possible. 133 This led to a major problem, for, as
Ted Robert Gurr testified for the defence, van der Merwe>s model
became a mere list of what revolutionaries might do, as ooposed
to what they actually did. 134 Because of this, van der Merwe"s
model failed to show a prima facie difference between
revolutionary and non-revolutionary groups.135
Faced with this, van der Merwe was forced to modify his claims,
altering his ingredients, saying his theory was not necessarily
predictive of revolutions, but only determined whether pre-
revolutionary circumstances existed.136 The key adaptation to the
model was this: the essential difference between revolutionary
and non-revolutionary groups was that revolutionary groups
contained all the elements alluded to and that their demands,
being incompatible with existing channels, could only be brought
about through revolution. 137 A much more important feature of the
diagnosis now was that their goals were revolutionary. The only
conceivable way in which one could, by this model, predict if a
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group were revolutionary, was if one thought that their demands
were too much for the system to bear: but even then one had to
assume that they would succeed in mobilising for revolt. The
definition thus became circular: what distinguished the
revolutionary nature of words spoken by the members of BPC and
8AS0 was that they were words spoken by revolutionaries, whose
vision of the future was unthinkable.
The problem this posed was how to judge black consciousness
against other protest groups. The defence sought to test this by
comparing the language of the trialists with phrases used by
Chief Buthelezi and the Coloured Labour Party. This jposed a
problem insofar as lnkatha"s constitution spoke of rejecting
racism, expectation and oppression. In answer, van der Merwe
claimed the difference was that Inkatha was attacking not the
whites, but the relics of colonialism. Since whites were not
directly asttacked, this was less of an attack on the legitimacy
of the system. 138 This was reiterated in discussing the Labour
Party documents which accused the whites of being motivated by
racism.139 Van der Merwe's explanation here was that the Labour
Party talked of change through dialogue. However, the more Soggot
questioned, the less clear the division was. Van der Merwe had to
look ever more closely at the way the ideas were expressed rather
than the ideas themselves. Ultimately, he had to concede the
difference was one of degree:
"Dit is *n graad verskil, Edele, in die sin dat hier word
gese * White people will find that Black people will not be
prepared to integrate with them on White terms,1 aan die
anderkant word daar gese in SASO dokumente dat die Witman
sal hier bly op die Swartman se voorwaardes. Nou ek wil
toegee dat daar 'n sekere mate van ooreenstemming daartussen
is, maar *n belangrike verskil."140
In terms of the broad concepts van der Merwe was using-
delegitimation, the unification of a group, counterideology-
there was no clear differentiation between the two examples. The
difference, where it existed, lay in the precise languao/e used on
either side, so that the revolutionary impact or potential of the
group was to be found less in their ideas or even action but in
the linguistic expression of them, as identified by political
scientists. Yet the problem with this precise linguistic analysis
was that it required a systematic examination of the nature and
authority of each document assessed; something that van der Merwe
omitted to do.141 In fact, the most violent dramatic language in
the documents came from those with the least representivity.142
The most obvious difference was that the black consciousness
groups refused to participate in existing political channels.
While other groups might say the same things, it was in a
different context.143 This argument presented two problems.
Firstly, it assumed that the CPRC, SAIC and bantustans were valid
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channels of constructive protest and an integral part of the
system. This was challenged by the defence, which contended that
since these institutions had no power nor effect, it made little
difference where the same words were said. Secondly, van der
Herwe made large assumptions about the nature of protest outside
these channels. While admitting that universities - where SASO
worked - were part of the system, he denied that the students
worked through normal university channels*144 These comments were
based on an excessively narrow interpretation of Eastonian
concepts, ignoring how protest outside formal structures could
still be a form of dialogue with the system; so that channeling
protest could be as much a counterrevolutionary as a
revolutionary force. He thus failed to show why working outside
the system of bantustans was necessarily revolutionary: yet
assumed that it was.
Ultimately, the key point that made them revolutionary was their
ambition to see a future not controlled by whites. For when
David soggot wondered what was revolutionary about the aims of
black consciousness - the rights of blacks to run their own lives
- van der Herwe saw the biggest threat lying in what would happen
to the whites, involving not only the fear of what might happen
"na die revolusie" but also the fact that in a new society
dominated by blacks, whites would be considered irrelevant.145
When added together, the fact that black consciousness sought not
to co-operate with whites, that it sought to espouse distinct
values and that it saw whites as irrelevant all made for
revolutionary potential. When van der Merwe seemed unable to
prove that the post-liberation society would necessarily be
antagonistic to whites, Rees, the prosecutor, interjected that
the issue was not what would occur after the revolution: it was
over the revolution being sought.146 This comment encapsulates
the paradoxical nature of the case. For the attempt was being
made to infer a revolution or a revolutionary method from the
ultimate goal13 being sufficiently alien as to be incompatible
with the current system of values, but then being unable to show
in detail how the ultimate goal would be revolutionary, in
precise terms. This was hardly surprising given the undefined
goals of the movement.
Ultimately van der Merwe>s predictive model of revolutionary
change collapsed under the expert battering of the defence
witnesses. Ultimately, he had to concede that revolutions were
born of frustration, not conspiracy.147 Given the battering the
model received from the defence, Boshoff in his judgment had to
conclude that it could neither predict revolutions nor show that
revolutionaries actually did what was claimed. The very same
actions by the defendants "could equally lead to a mere change in
the type of political system and not necessarily to system-
failure. "148 indeed, in his judgment, Boshoff undertook a long
survey of political science to show that political system had to
have a capacity to respond to stresses,149 "acting constructively
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to prevent disturbances in the system's environment." For systems
to persist, they had to change. Boshoff applied all this to South
Africa, "in our country," he said, "we have democratic regime
norms, and freedom of speech and assembly play an important part
in our party system which is based on opposing views and
consequent dispute of ideas. It may best serve its high purpose
when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction
with conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."150
Importantly, he added that "[i]n the case of the blacks we must
remember that if they use language which may seem to be
unnecessarily strong, they have no effective voice or vote in the
authoritative allocation of values and can only protest against
what may be regarded by them as grievances." This seemed a very
balanced view of things, and led the judge to conclude that all
these factors made it impossible for political scientists to
propound rigid theories about the future course of events in
political life. Following Gurr, the judge distinguished between
revolutionary and protest groups, which might overlap in respect
of objectives, organisation and tactics, but which differed in
strategies and demands: "Revolutionary groups demand the
destruction of the existing political, economic and social
system and sometimes demand the escape from the political system
and increased autonomy for their own group."151 They worked
secretly, rarely using rallies, demonstrations or strikes.
On that basis, Boshoff decided "neither SASO nor BFC has the
characteristics of a revolutionary group" wanting revolutionary
change by violent means. This ruling attracted much attention,
for it seemed to vindicate the organisations at least on one
level. In the light of Singh's and van der Herwe's evidence,
there seemed, therefore, little of a case to answer. We must now
turn to examine how the court rehabilitated Singh1s secrets and
van der Merwe's fears to secure a conviction on the charge of
promoting racial hostility. Here, it will be seen how far the
case was determined not by hard questions of lav or fact, but by
subjective interpretations of South African life.
Securing the Conspiracy
(i) Contending Assumptions
The defence argued that SASO and BFC were ordinary political
protest groups, which sought fundamental change, but not by
revolutionary or illegal means, but through bargaining. It was
the defence's contention that "the language and content of SASO
and BFC documents cannot be properly understood without an
appreciation of the reality experienced from day to day in the
Black community."152 As a background to this, it was pointed out
that blacks had no vote, faced daily discrimination, were
deprived of land and faced constant harassment. In this section,
we will see how the case as put by the defence was attacked by a
prosecution which sought to deny these facts, to trivialise them
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and to portray a 'different* black world from that described by
the defendants* The two sides thus were not so much arguing clear
facts to apply to rules determining innocence or guilt, but were
competing for the sensibilities and compassion of the judge.
To establish its case, the defence counsel gave as much time as
possible to the accused to relate their experiences.153 The
inference to be drawn from this was that the ideas put forward by
black consciousness were not new but reflected people'3 common
thoughts: 154 as Mokoape put it, "it provides a vent for Black
people caught up in this morass, and to that extent it provides a
hope for black people."155 Against, the court's contentions that
they were agitating, Mokoape simply said, "I know of no Black man
who can spend one day of 24 hours without discussing the
harshness and cruelties of White society. It is just something we
live with."156 There was no need to push black consciousness
ideas into the forefront. The policy of dividing families and
removing people was not just something that SASO members had seen
as a result of their community work: it affected their own
families as well.157
It was the testimony of Biko and Adam Small that most exposed the
court to the thinking of the oppressed black, and the poverty of
his existence. The defence case was one of interpretation: the
language and content of BPC documents, it was contended, could
not be properly understood unless one understood the reality of
daily black life.This involved looking at the broader problems of
South African society: that blacks had no vote, that they were
discriminated against in daily life, that they were deprived of
land and labour, that township life was degraded. 158 As a result,
blacks felt rejected and hopeless and it was as a consequence of
this that they spoke of oppression and condemned the whites.
Biko was very forthcoming on this, describing the humiliation
that blacks were daily subjected to in respect of the pass laws:
"you are made in some instances to stand naked in front of some
doctors supposed to be running pus off you, because you may be
bringing syphilis to the town he tells you ... and as you enter
the room where this is done in Durban there is a big notice
saying: 'Beware - Natives in a state of undress1."159 As a result
of this, every conversation turned on the situation of
oppression, with people on buses and in the streets talking
constantly of the oppression. Protest talk was everywhere, in
daily life, in songs.160
This raised the question of the intensity of language. It was a
vital question, given that so much hinged on the precise
interpretation and impact of words used in the documents. Two
points stood out: first, that the language used in the documents
reflected the common talk of township life; and second, that the
strength of the language did not carry the same implications for
an African as it did for a European. At base, what was said about
the whites was true, and reflected what blacks felt about the
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whites and their system. 161 As for the language, Biko pointed
out it was political, and not to be analysed for fine nuaSces of
meaning in a calm court. More importantly, no one at a meeting
would remember specific words, but would only follow the overall
reality behind this is much more important tnan JUST: p
like 'oppressors, guerrillas' and these things."163 However, in
the minute discussions of the court, even the most frivolous
expressions were given detailed scrutiny,164 the prosecution
seeking mechanical meanings throughout. Thus, a discussion of
Glenn Masekoane's poem * Black Nana>(one of the items listed in
the first indictment) 165 with an expert witness, Gessler Nkondo,
produced the following comic exchange:
REES: Isn't the poem merely a setting forth of ideas?
NKONDO: No.
REES: What is a poem then? The function of a poem and
poetry?166
The prosecution case was based on a number of apparently
paradoxical assumptions. On the one hand, it was assumed that a
potentially revolutionary situation existed in South Africa
between the races. On the other lay the view that all was
fundamentally well, and that blacks were contented, only rising
to anger if acted on by agitators. These two were resolved by the
further assumption that any fundamental change was impossible to
achieve, that black participation in white society was
unthinkable.
The first assumption could be seen indirectly in the racial
antagonism evident in the trial. The divergence of views was
evident in debates over some of the flashpoints in South African
history. In cross examining Cooper, Rees focussed on a BPC
document which listed occasions where the police had shot at
blacks, and which stated that the police had never threatened
the police. 167 Here, Rees launched into a long description of
events at Cato Manor, listing the policemen who were killed and
itemising their injuries in detail. "That was the type of
treatment the police received there just two months before your
Sharpeville," Rees commented, "You are not even aware of
that."168 For Rees, this incident was a key factor in explaining
why the police shot at Sharpeville* The battle fought over
history in the court was thus one way of identifying a hidden
agenda of black consciousness- Rees• interpretation of
Sharpeville must also be seen in light of his vision of the
police as vital bastions of law and order. Faced with Mokoape*s
point that the police guarding the tiny post should have fled
rather than guarded it at the cost of human life, Rees said that
if the police abandoned their posts - even the smallest - there
would be chaos. Mokoape ventured to suggest that the police had
other choices besides shooting and fleeing - for instance, they
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could have given warning shots first. Roes' response was
immediate: "Do you know that that is the most dangerous thing you
can ever do is fire over people1s heads, it just spurs them on,
don"t you know that?"169 This was to focus entirely on the
police's point of view: after all, firing directly into a crowd
also had its dangers* The respective attitudes of prosecutor and
defendant resflected their divergent social positions: where the
prosecutor saw the security police as necessary to preserve
order and prevent crime, the defendants saw them only as
harassing blacks and preserving a partial white set of interests.
The nature of the antagonism can be seen in the debate over terms
used to descibe other races. Rees referred throughout the trial
to Blacks as Bantu, though various witnesses explained to him why
blacks found it either objectionable or senseless. The reason for
Rees' persistence was brought out in his cross examination of
Sedibe. People like Sedibe, he suggested, were touchy about
being referred to as Bantu, yet they themselves called the whites
enemies, racists and killers.170 This was an interesting
illustration of the prosecutor's assumptions. The word 'bantu'
described (and defined) the inferior legal and social status of
the blacks, and summed up their oppression. The words used
against the whites were a political rhetoric that evolved in
response. Rees used the former as neutral and the latter as
revolutionary: yet the very fact that he was using language to
score points showed that the antagonism was two-way.171
The potentially explosive tensions in society were also addressed
in the discussion of Mozambican independence. Where the accused
claimed that the independence of Mozambique was the product of a
change of government in Portugal and its subsequent negotiations
with Frelimo, the prosecution retorted that it was as a result of
the guerrilla war that there had been a coup in Portugal in the
first place. The prosecution saw the new regime in Lourenco
Marques as one that chased the whites out. When Kyeza said he saw
no reason for whites to leave, Rees responded, "Oh, you would
like some whites to call you baas, wouldn't you? "17 2 The
discussion came down to white fears and to the inconceivability
of blacks and whites coexisting:
REES: The foreign settlers will leave South Africa too,
won't they?
MYEZA: No, where have they got to go in the first place?
Those people went back to Portugal, where is the white South
African going to go?
REES: You realise the whites will have to stand and fight?
MYEZA: Not because of that, no, everybody is talking about
living together.173
This was a familiar enough discussion. However, it brought these
large speculations into the ambit of court consideration and
thereby influenced the interpretation of actions.17 4
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The state's belief in a revolutionary context vas raised in the
cross examination of Gurr. The background context in which the
prosecution felt all BPC and SASO documents had to be interpreted
was one of inherent violence. 175 The prosecution thus contended
that since Gurr1 detailed knowledge on South Africa was limited,
he could not properly interpret documents .17 6 This was a key
point in the rehabilitation of van der Merwe in the eyes of the
court, for in giving judgment, Boshoff pointed out that
"Professor Gurr admittedly lacked the necessary South African
background to be able to express any reliable views on the
meaning of the documents"177 whereas "Mr van der Merwe confined
his evidence to the significance of the documents in a
revolutionary context."178 Although the court, mindful of the
experts, did not fully follow van der Merwe, the social
contextualisation of the documents was crucial to understand the
true nature of the organisations.
This picture of the potentially revolutionary nature of the South
African context contrasted with a totally different assumption
over the nature of black life. Both the prosecution and the court
felt in essence that there was nothing wrong in society, that
blacks were in essence contented. The prosecution could not.
accept the notion that there were shared black experiences,
continuing to conceive of blacks as ethnically divided. In face
of defence arguments that SASO ideas merely reflected what went
on in the community, Rees countered, "How can a man know? How do
you know what the average Zulu in Zululand knows?"17 9 The
ethnicity of a man mattered, and politicised blacks like the
defendants could not be relied on to reflect this. Hence, in
questioning on the nature of township life, Rees would focus on
faction fights and tribal conflicts. The context of African
excitability was the context in which to put the agitation of
black consciousness. 180 Thus, Rees told Gurr that faction fights
were the traditional way that Africans settled their disputes.181
These assumptions were shared by Boshoff, who asked Myeza if
blacks were not rather touchy and easily provoked, since they
fought so readily. Where the defendants claimed that faction
fights were the result of a competition for scarce resources,
fuelled by the artificial fragmentation of the people, the court
saw them as evidence of tribes hating each other. The question
of ethnicity was obviously central given the agitation against
the bantustans, for the prosecution took for granted among blacks
the existence of a full ethnic national pride.
MOKOAPE: Mr. Rees, whatever you may think, whatever the
white system in this country may think, these national prides do
not exist.
REES: That may be the Aubrey Mokoape concept. [•••]
MOKOAPE: [T]his I think is again tied up with this whole
question of whites saying they are experts over blacks ... We
are not objects of study, to be studied by the white system.
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REES: Why not, doctor?182
In this context, the presence of Indians among the leadership
could only be seen as the presence of troublemaXers. Rees*
fascination with ethnicity took root in his cross examination of
Cooper. "Are you," he began, "of the group that are now known as
Pakistan or Hindustan or India proper?"183 He then sought to
establish his position in a caste system, in the hope of finding
a caste difference between Cooper and Singh that might explain
their attitude to each other. He also laid stress on the racial
tension between African and Indian, particularly in the Durban
riots of 1949, in an effort to make a clear differentiation of
groups. "You are not part of the black races, are you," he asked
Cooper, "You are part of the olive-skinned races, aren't you?"184
Boshoff's similarly was essentially convinced that blacks were
not at base discontented. This was evident in his examination of
Cooper:
COURT: [W]ould you necessarily become aware of [your
oppression] unless somebody keeps reminding you of it or
reminding you of your grievances?
COOPER: That is the situation and the situation must remind
you of that [.••]
COURT: Isn*t human nature strange in that way? You really
accept your position and isn't the black man a fatalist in his
outlook in life? Doesn't he accept the position? Unless you tell
him, now, your position is very bad.
COOPER: Well, I am a black man and I am standing here [...]
COURT: Yes, but who reminded you of the oppression?
COOPER: Well, I do not think anybody has - everyday
experience. The experience of black life.
COURT: Yes, but I have to work, I mean, I am born, I was not
born rich, I have got to come here every day and start at ten
o'clock and listen to this ... LAUGHTER18S
Whereas the ideologues of black consciousness looked to the gap
of black and white, Boshoff perceived no essential distance
between the individual contentment of the races. Both prosecutor
and judge at key moments revealed their failure to understand why
a black man might object to the status quo. Rees thus asked
Hokoape for a list of his grievances:
MOKOAPE: My grievances are that I have not the right to
determine my life. I have been excluded from those structures
which govern the lives of the people and that ... (intervenes)
REES: You see, I am in the same boat as you are.
MOKOAPE: No, you cannot be because you vote, after every
four years you go and cast a vote.
REES: That vote has not been of much use. Once they go to
parliament they do what they like.
HOKOAPE: No, no, it is definitely of use because you can
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organise a number of people with similar grievances as you and
you can out-vote those other people who are in parliament if you
do not want them.
REES: That is just a theory.
MOKOAPE: it is not a theory. I cannot even do it and when I
do organise I get charged* LAUGHTER186
Boshoff entered this discussion, to reinforce Rees1 point that
individual votes - or even success in individual constituencies-
did not change the political situation much. Good humoured as it
was, the discussion revealed the inability or unwillingness of
both judge and prosecutor to see the whites as constituting a
collective monopoly on power, insisting on looking from the
viewpoint of the fragmented voter. The assumption they relied on
was that the constant reminder of grievances would turn happy
people into violent one. This was one of the central questions of
the case, and an issue where Gurr had testified extensively that
before people were agitated over a described wrong, they had to
see it as a wrong: and even if they did, one could never predict
their response. 187 At all events, a contented group would ignore
attempts to arouse their anger.188
Despite this, Boshoff felt that in essence BPC and SASO were
troublemakers, as was evident from his discussion of the
homelands. Boshoff pointed out to Lekota that a large
proportion of South Africa was about to be granted independence.
If BPC existed to bargain with the whites, therefore, it could
have no function here. The black consciousness attitude to the
reality of bantustanisation imported again their revolutionary
aspirations:
COURT: Well now all I want to know is whether you people
took into account at the time when you started BFC and you
formulated your policy, that you are ultimately not going to
bargain with the white man in respect of quite a large area of
South Africa, because these countries are becoming Black areas,
independent homelands?
LEKOTA: That issue would not feature in the case of SASO,
M'lord, in the case of BPC I do not know whether they did think
along those lines or not.
COURT: Well now if they did not, doesn't that tend to show
that they were not interested in what was happening to the
country, they were really just preparing themselves to deal with
the white man and the white system?189
For Boshoff, the homeland issue was quite straightforward. "[I]f
your policies are only to bargain, well then you are being
outwitted by the government if the government is cutting off all
these homelands," he said. This debate, on the eve of Transkeian
independence, was another example of the judge using contentious
policy as inevaitable fact. By accepting the policy of giving
independence as uncontentious, the judge made the arguments
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against it adopted by the black consciousness organisers seem
contradictory and hence malicious.190 The constitutional
impossibility of change was also reiterated by the judge, in an
argument that the white government had been elected: and that if
it tried to reform, the whites would vote them out of office.
Even if the government wanted to change, it would not have the
authority.191
The Xey that united the court's attitudes was the fact that
ultimately, the type of society envisaged by the black
consciousness groups was not a feasible one.192 The bottom line
for the judge was that black consciousness entailed a
redistribution of wealth and a total change of values, which were
unacceptable. The judge was more articulate in his fears than the
accused in their aspirations:193
COURT: Now what is to happen if the whites do not want to
part with their wealth? • •. Mr Cooper, now do you seriously
believe that the white man will just say well ... here is my
property, now you can distribute it.
COOPER: [•••] We haven't formulated the nechanics of how
this process is going to take place, but we have got the
structure and that structure is unity for the purposes of
collective bargaining from a position of strength.
COURT: No, but your purpose is not collective bargaining.
Your purpose is total change and total change is that the white
man must hand over his property for redistribution, that is how I
understand the policies of BFC, because that is total change and
the redistribution of power and wealth.194
The problem was that this was something the judge could not see
come about peacefully, for Boshoff said, "isn't it just a pipe
dream unless there is a violent revolution, because how can you
deprive private individuals of their property unless you have a
revolution?"195 For Boshoff, the logic of the demands of black
consciousness was revolutionary, if only for the reason that the
whites would resist.196 In the end, what the black consciousness
ideologues wanted was simply impossible; and their offence was to
make the blacks anticipate it. This would aim to intimidate the
whites:
"Well, let's cut into the problem, isn't your whole theory
based on fear? If you would have a united power bloc then
your whole premise is that the white man will fear that bloc
and will negotiate with the bloc? If the blacks are divided
then there is nothing to fear?"l97
Against this; Saths Cooper pointed out that the united bloc aimed
to make blacks promote their feeling of worth, and that there was
no occasion when they had advocated violence. The latter point
was dismissed by the judge, pointing to the fact that if they had
advocated violence, "you will have yourself in hot water before
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you start."198 The implicit violence lay in telling the people
that they vqere unhappy and reminding them constantly of the
causes of their oppression. It was therefore significant
politically that they sought to begin community projects in
deprived areas, where discontent would be most fertile. Boshoff"s
hunches were uncharitable. "I am not suggesting the black man is
not at a disadvantage," he told Mokoape, but "assuming that you
are at that disadvantage that you mention, now if you exaggerate
it by spreading stories, then there can only be one reason for
doing it and that is to make mischief."199 Spreading mischief, as
Mokoape pointed out, went wholly against the idea of
conscientisation. Clearly, the spirit of van der Merwe was
hovering•
(ii) The judgment: securing the conspiracy
However, when judgment was handed down on 15 December 1976, it
became apparent that Bosnoff's social prejudices on matters of
fundamental assumption, had swung the case for the prosecution.
Since the charges against the nine were brought under the
Terrorism Act, which defined as terroristic any act done with the
intent to endanger the maintenance of law and order,200 the judge
had great scope to convict: but even given th act, his judgment
was remarkable for its minimal discussion of law and its
extensives discussion of politics. In this case, since the
accused were not charged in the main count with any specific
acts, but rather with a conspiracy, the statutory presumption of
intent20l did not apply. Hence, the state had to prove an intent
to disturb law and order. At the end of the state's case, Boshoff
did give a definition of this,202 as well as a definition of
conspiracy. Yet in his final judgment, he made no use of these
concepts, but sought to infer a conspiracy and intent from an
overall political interpretation of their ideas. He made no
attempt to make a precise link to show how the acts of the
accused would lead to a disruption of law and order. Instead, the
conspiratorial claims of both Singh and van der Merwe were
rehabilitated via the social prejudices of the court.
The judge's interpretation was deeply indebted to Singh,203
even at its most contentious. Thus, Boshoff accepted Singh1s
contention that Mayathula had been angry on 25 September because
he felt that they were precipitating a violent conflict he felt
the organisations were not yet ready for. By accepting one of
Singh«s contentions, the court used it as confirmation of the
second. "This attitude of Mayathula," Boshoff ruled, "confirms
Singh's evidence that BPC was against confrontation during the
first three years while it was building up a membership of one
million and conscientising its members, and that BPC should then
work for a national tools down."204 Boshoff similarly believed
his version of events at the BPC inaugural convention and the
allegations of a national strike plan developed there,205
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accepting Singh's evidence on the existence of a supreme command.2 0
The fact that Cooper also summoned Mayathula to the Durban rally
"gives credence to the evidence of Singh that accused numbers 1,
4 and Mayathula formed an influential body referred to by
themselves as the supreme command."207 in this way, Singh's
commentary was used to knit together disparate events and
influences into a well planned and co-ordinated conspiracy. This
was far from reality, for even a cursory glance at the nature of
the organisations would have undermined such a view of the
organisations•
Bosboff's acceptance of Singh's evidence was legally
problematic-208 While accepting that he was not wholly reliable
or consistent, he cited a precedent to show that the court was
not precluded from relying on this evidence if it was satisfied
beyond reasonable doubt that the essential features of the story
he told were true.209 The problem was what these essential
features were: in Singh's testimony, they were an interpretative
gloss on the very details that he was unreliable on. The facts
that seemed to prove the conspiracy - the response of the
organisations to crisis situations - could equally be seen not to
be part of a grand conspiracy. Indeed, the defence argued that
the 'essential features* relied on by the state were outside the
ambit of admissable evidence for the conspiracy charge.210 The
state at no point proved that what Mayathula had said was in
pursuance of the common purpose, was relevant to the charges in
the indictment, or were even prima facie proof of a
conspiracy.211
As the defence tried to pin down the notion of conspiracy, the
judge expanded it. Boshoff stated that the conspiracy alleged by
the prosecution was to be inferred mainly from basic policy
documents and interpretative documents of the organisations.212
Vet little effort was made to assess the status of documents and
relate them to the accused, the judge retreating behind the rule
that acts of each conspirator were attributable to all the
conspirators.213 The reasoning was circular: Singh's allegations
about the secret conspiracy gave a sense to the minor documents,
which in turn could be used to verify the intentions of the
accused.214 Thus, long parts of the judgment involved a recital
of dramatic documents with strong language, as if cumulatively
they would confirm Singh1s contention and the judge's fear.
This meant that, while the judge ruled that the organisations
were not revolutionary, he in effect changed the the semantic
terms and in effect convicted the defendants of the same
thing.215 He interpreted the ideology of black consciousness as
trying to overcome the inertness of the blacks, who (the judge
noted) had been too afraid to take meaningful action. "They were
not yet prepared to sacrifice themselves for their ideals," the
judcje commented, "[t]he conspirators realised that politial
action was necessary of the kind devised by SAfiO and BPC not to
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ameliorate the position of the blacks, but to mobilise and
prepare the blacks to involve them in a total struggle for a
total change."216 In these sentences, the judge dismissed all the
community elements of the black consciousness movement and
revived the spectre of revolution. The judgment therefore laid
great stress on the violent aspects of black consciousness: the
notion of the martyrdom of blacks who had died in the struggle;
the portarayal of Christ as a revolutionary freedom fighter; the
stress on the violent nature of the whites and the justifiability
of the use of force against them*
The conclusion that the organisations were protest groups rather
than revolutionary ones thus was merely semantic. SASO and BPC
were not normal political organisations seeking peaceful change:
"There is nothing in the evidence to suggest that there was any
genuine desire to bargain," he said. "The whites were
represented as the persons who held all the land and who would
not change."217 This ignored altogether the argument of Biko and
others that the process of bargaining had already begun and was
not something to await formulation. In making his conclusion, the
judge was clearly influenced by the nature of the demands put and
their unacceptibility in his mind. For the total change, he said,
would involve a redistribution of wealth and an expropriation of
the whites. Such things were not subjects for bargaining.
In the end, the case turned wholly on the subjective fears of the
court. Interpreting Biko's evidence, Boshoff said that at best,
blacks sav whiteness as a concept to be despised, hated and
destroyed. "At worst, blacks envied white society for the comfort
it had usurped and at the centre of this envy was the wish - nay,
the secret determination - in the innermost minds of most blacks
who thought like this, to kick whites off those comfortable
garden chairs that one saw as one rode in a bus out of town, and
to claim them for themselves."218 Black consciousness was thus
seen to be motivated by greed and envy, and impelled by violence.
Boshoff thus listed the most provocative resolutions and the most
dramatic poems, regardless of their status*
Boshoff focussed quite strongly on the role of children in black
consciousness ideology. He stressed the co-operation that existed
between SASO and SASM and laid emphasis on the work that SASO
sought to do in schools. The judgment quoted widely from
commissions at the Turfloop Formation School, particularly the
report on 'Infiltration of the Training Institutions.1 Early in
his judgment, Boshoff looked particularly at the way
conscientisation was directed at children, and he quoted from the
SASO Newsletter: "The onus is on the black women to plant this
black tree that is going to bear black fruit."219 It was not
incidental that he should have laid stress on this, given the
Soweto uprising and SASM13 involvement in it. This was not made
explicit by the judge: but it is clear that events in Soweto were
not out of his mind. The judge assumed that all was fundamentally
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well in society, but tor the actions of these troublemakers.220
Where the accused had said what they felt vas true, the judge saw
only its impact on creating hostility to whites. The point that
the anger already existed, and that the words merely mirrored the
beliefs of the blacks, vent over the head of the judge. He
similarly appeared to ignore the fact stressed by many
witnesses221 that the organisations opted for legal action and
worked in an open and above board manner as a natter of policy.
However, this latter point was crucial in the decision that the
organisations wre protest groups, not revolutionary: an
organisation could be open and act according to the law, yet
still be an unlawful conspiracy. This was to allow the court to
marginalise the vast majority of BPC and SASO1a vork and nature.
Step by step, the conspiracy was built up, using the approach of
van der Herwe, which said that a theory of revolution had to be
seen as a whole. The state1 s submission was that men like Gurr
missed the point when they tried to undermine van der Merwe's
theory bit by bit, for it had to be seen as a whole.222 At its
most ridiculous, this seemed to argue that even though all the
constituent parts of the structure had been undermined, the
structure could still stand. However, it was the approach of
Boshoff. Piece by piece, the acts and writings of the
organisations were obscure, ambiguous and unthreatening, but seen
as a whole, they had effect. "Considered in its totality,11 the
judge concluded, the method used was designed to foster
hostility between the races, "and thus to create amongst the
blacks a hostile power bloc orientated for action, more
particularly for political violence."223 The eight (which
excluded Sedibe) charged under the first count were therefore
convicted.
All the accused under the second count (the rally count, which
excluded cindi and Hoodley) were convicted. A number of features
of the judgment stand out. First, the judge sought to obtain
clear and unambiguous versions of the events and the intentions
behind them, that were wholly insensitive to the context of the
events.224 With the Durban rally, he sought precise answers about
events covering three minutes; with Turfloop, he was impervious
+-r\xamvA* ••>*« «v<oHiMt tAnsiona on camDU3*225 „ For the judge, the
police were neutral, and hostility to them vas manufactured
lawlessness.226 "It is part of the strategy of SASO and BPC to
denigrate the police," he said, "The hostility towards the
police, therefore, existed, and was not incurred by police
action."227 This view was reflected in his reading of the
placards: "X think it is fair to say that the placards provided
some evidence of SASO and BPC policy coming to fruition,M228
The judge concluded that the rallies had succeeded in bringing
together a group of persons of sufficient size and cohesiveness,
sufficiently orientated towards action, as to endanger law and
order.229 These acts, said Boshoff, "had and were also likely to
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have had at Durban and Turf loop the result of encouraging
forcible resistance to the government on the part of all the
persons who attended the rallies [•••] of causing serious bodily
injury and of endangering the safety of persons attending the
rallies, or persons enforcing the law." Seven men were thus
convicted of terrorism for planning rallies that never took
place, and vhere the police had always been in full control.
Faced with the simple words of the statute, the judge turned the
damp squibs of the two rallies into major confrontations.
However, what allowed the judge to do this was his certainty of
the inherently conspiratorial and confrontational nature of the
organisations.
1. The nine were Saths Cooper, PRO of BPC until his banning in
March 1973, Muntu Myeza, Secretary General of SASO,Terror Lekota,
Permanent Organiser of SASO, Aubrey Mokoape, a founder member of
BPC, Nkwenkwe Nkomo, chaiman of the Daveyton branch of BPC,
Pandelani Nefolovhodwe, national president of SASO, Kaborane
Sedibe, President of the Turfloop SRC, Strini Mood ley, former
publications director of SASO, and Zithulele cindi, Secretary
General of BPC. Originally, members of the Theatre Council of
Natal (TECON) and the People's Experimental Theatre (PET) were
included in the indictment, but charges against them were
separated in early 1975, and they never came to trial. A complete
transcript of the trial is available in the Department of
Historical Papers in the William Cullen Library at the University
of the Witwatersrand (AD 1719 Mfm). I am very grateful to the
librarians there for their generous assistance.
2. See state Heads of Argument - Introduction, pp. 37-42.
3. Exhibit SASO El p. 244.
4. Exhibits SASO G4 p. 166; Tl 80-4; Ml 44; 01 131.
5. State Heads - Count 1, p. 143.
6. Record, p. 3902.
7. For histories of the movement, see Gail Gerhart, Black Power
in South Africa, Berkeley 1978, John D. Brewer, After Soweto: an
Unfinished Journey, Oxford 1986, Baruch Hirson, Year of FireT
Year of Ash, London 1979. For the background of SASO, see also
SASO 1972 (Exhibit SASO QX) , and Record p. 4342-3; AD 1719 Mfm.
II, Minutes of the 2nd GSC held 4-10 July, 1971 (Exhibit SASO
Al), Minutes of the Proceedings of the 3rd General Students
Council of the South African Students Organisation (Exhibit SASO
Cl) . For BPC, see also examinations of Mokoape, Record 4854,
Biko, Record 4432, Minutes of National Organisations Conference
held at the Orlando YMCA from 17.12.71 to 19.12.71. (Exhibit BPC
Al) (Resolution no. 2), Paper, Black People's Convention.
Historical Background (Exhibit BPC Rl) p. l.
8. Contrast SASO's 1971 Declaration of student Rights which
merely declared that education in the university of one's choice
was the right of all, with the 1972 resolution which saw this to
be misrepresenting the aspirations of the black, student and
"paying homage to a Utopian situation which bears little
relevance to our Black experience." Minutes or tne proceedings or
the 3rd General students Council of the South African students'
organisation. Resolution 50/72. In its place was erectea a Black
students manifesto which declared the students to be an integral
part of the oppressed community "committed to work towards tae
building of our people and to the winning of their struggle for
liberation and guided by the central purpose of service to the
Black Community on every technical and social level." Res 34/72.
See further Res 24/72. See also Minutes of the BPC held at the
Lay Ecumenical Centre, Edendale, (Exhibit BPC Bl) p. 5-6, where
it was decided to recruit one million members.
9. See Examination of Lekota. Record 5257. Minutes of the
Proceedings of the 3rd General students' Council, p. 22/ Cross-
examination of Koodley, Record 7560, Jerry Modisane, "Why I
walked off Fort Hare in Protest1 SASO Newsletter May/June 1972,
p. 16.
10. see Fact sheet; the UWC Crisis,
11. At Fort Hare, where the absence of an SRC had given SASO
greater importance, the Rector was reported to have said "I want
to kill SASO, because of the uncompromising attitude adopted by
their national leaders, and now spreading to their rank and
file." Branch Report of SASO Fort Hare to Fourth GSC, p. 3.
Student leaders at Fort Hare were disciplined for holding
'illegal1 meetings on campus, and students were denied the right
automatically to affiliate to SASO, a problem also experienced at
Ngoye. Report of the University of Zulu land for 197 3. Harrassment
of SASO was a constant feature, with one member of the UNB SRC
even being charged after a student meeting with inciting racial
hostility. There were similarly problems with student unity: not
all the students at Turf loop marched off the campus In the
aftermath of the Tiro affair while the UNB branch had to report
in March 1973 that "[student] relations on the campus are rather
discouraging. The student body has, since the Tiro affair,
divided." Report of the University of Zululand for 1973, p. 2.
12. Reports of Maphumulo and REE8O Branches to Fourth GSC. REESO
members kept In touch with SASO affairs through the Regional
Office of SASO in Johannesburg, but found a deafening silence
when they called for participants in projects.
13. Reports of Western Cape and Durban Central.
14. Reports presented at the Federal Theological Seminary Alice
(Exhibit SASO Ml) p 21.
15. 25 branches were represented at this congress, with 200
people attending, rising in 1973 to 34 branches. However, many of
these branches had very small membership, such as the Overport
branch of which Harri Singh was chairman, a branch which was
inactive. Examination of Singh. Record 540.
16. They were Biko, Cooper, Drake Koka, Bokve Hafuna, Jerry
Modisane, Moodley, Herry Nengwekhulu and Barney Pityana.
Nevertheless, its activities were sufficient to attract the
attention of the security police, the first raid on their
offices coming in June that year, vhen Mosibude Hangena and Sipho
Buthelezi were arrested, the former later being convicted of
recruiting for military training,the latter later fleeing the
country. See M. Mangena, On Your Own; Evolution of Black
Consciousness in South Africa/Azania, Braamfontein 1989 pp 55-75
for Mangena*s account of his trial.
17. Exhibit PPP2. Quoted in Record 7673* The Sharpeville branch,
which overlapped with the Sharpeville Youth Club, dropped the BPC
name for that very reason. Other branches shoved independence
over their own name, in a way to incur the wrath of head office,
such as the *Amanzimtoti Liberation Front.1 Examination of Cindi.
Record 7675-6See also the problems the organisation had in
raising funds. Minutes of the Second Annual National Congress, p.
3 (BPC HI)•
18. Examination of Cindi. Record 7627. Some delegates were in
fact only convenors, because in some areas there was not
sufficient support to set up fully fledged branches. Cross-
examination of Cindi. Record 7838-9. The congress revealed a
failure of communication between head office and local branches,
and some tension arose because branches, in seeking to raise
their own funds, were undermining head office. BPC Resolution
3/73, in Minutes of the Second Annual Congress (Exhibit BPC HI).
19. In response to this, BPC issued a pamphlet congratulating
the * Brothers and Sisters of Chatsworth1 on the tram boycott.
However, BPC played a far smaller role in the protest than was
played by NIC, which had called and organised meetings.
Examination of Cooper* Record 3621-2.
20. Pamphlet (Exhibit BPC D2) issued on 23 October 1972.
21. Black People's Convention - Press Release: 3.3.1973 (Exhibit
22. Examination of Mokoape. Record 4890*
23. Transcript of the Tape Recorded Statements allegedly made at
Kajee Hall on 21.3.1973, (Exhibit BPC E4) p. 1.
24. Being a new movement, working in a political void caused by
the repression of earlier organisations, the black consciousness
ideologues were aware of the dangers of operating in an
explicitly confrontational way. See the comments of Aubrey
Mokoena on the reasons for the failure of the ANC and PAC. Record
p. 5235. Such contact as there was with exiled organisations was
tenuous and individual and did not translate itself into any aim
to relaunch those organisations domestically or to revive their
methods or ideology. There was a sense that the old leaders,
although heroes, had been defeated. "Right now, there are people
who are dying right in Robben Island because of their
convictions," Harry Nengwekhulu told a SASO meeting at the
University of Natal»s Black section, "They are rotting there
because they have been destroyed." Transkripsie van bandopnames
gemaak vir SAP veiligheidstak (Exhibit SASO Bl) p. 28. See also
paper There is a wave that has been sweeping throughout AZAKIA. •
Annexure 7 to indictment.
25* steve BiXo, Record p. 4502.
26. Blackness v Nihilism1 SASO Newsletter August 1971.
27. SASO Resolution 2.1/11* This resolution provided for the
appointment of a research team to look at black history and
compile material on the subject. Some sketches had already been
put out by BPC. See their papers On the Way to Sharpeville
(Exhibit BPC E5) and A Brief Review of the Black Struggle for
Liberation in South Africa (Exhibit BPC E6).
28. 'Black Consciousness, the black artist and the emerging
black culture,1 SASO Newsletter May/June 1972. Groups like TECON
gave an improvised theatre of revolt, which mixed entertainment,
ideology and experience. Thus, in 1971, TECON toured the black
campuses with a production of "Into the Heart of Negritude", a
piece which mixed jazz and poetry to develop philosophical ideas.
While such art articulated the feelings of the oppressed, as an
art form it lacked the direction and purpose of political
agitation.
29. "We've crossed our Rubicon, we crossed it a long time ago, we
crossed it at BAHBATA in 1906, when he declared ... that he was
going to fight for the liberation of his country." Transcript of
the Tape-Recorded statements allegedly made at Kajee Hall on
21.3.1973 (Aubrey Mokoape) p.2 (Exhibit BPC El).
30. Harri Singh told the 1973 Sharpeville Comnemoration, that
"SHARPEVILLE didn't start 13 years ago. SHARPEVILLE started way,
way back when that long -haired pale-faced terrorist by the name
of JAN VAN RIEBEECK landed here."Ibid, p. 6. The movement soon
had its own martyrs to commemorate, after O. A. R. Tiro had been
killed by parcel bomb in Botswana, and Mthuli ka Shezi had been
pushed in front of a train by a white railway official after the
first BPC Congress. Money was collected for a tombstone for
Shezi, which was unveiled in Tembisa in December 1973, when a
pamphlet told mourners that the assassination was part of an
assault on the whole of the black community.
31. Editorial SASO Newsletter August 1971. See also I write p. 106
32. See, e.g., 'The Definition of Black Consciousness1 reprinted
in S. Biko, I Write What I Like, p. 65. This was a paper
presented at a SASO seminar on Black Consciousness and Community
Development held at Edendale on 4-8 December 1971. See also
Resolution 42/71 3 (a). Minutes of the Second General Students'
Council of the South African students' organisation, p. 11
(Exhibit SASO A(l)).
33. See Temba Sono, 'Some concepts of Negritude', SASO Newsletter
June 1971, p. 19: "Negritude by its ontology is a combination of
matter and spirit which manifests itself in energy and force, not
kinematic as a network of radial forces which are tangential and
radial energies i.e. external, material and quantitative on the
one hand and internal, psychic and qualitative on the other."
34. The ideology has thus been criticised for being excessively
intellectual, for lacking a class analysis and for being by a
privileged elite. See, e.g., Baruch Hirson, Year of Fire, Year of
Ash. In fact, as can be seen, the error lay in an undeveloped
intellectual ideology, so that the main pragmatic concerns of the
movement turned to grassroots action more than sophisticated
political action.
35. The rhetoric of Black Consciousness was anti-capitalist
insofar as it saw capitalism as one of the repugnant elements of
Western culture. SASO paper 'The Repugnant Elements in Western
Culture1 (Exhibit SASO Rl); Black People's Convention's Policy
9th June '73, by Vice President (Exhibit BPC Ql). Foreign
investment was opposed ai exploitative since it enriched
foreigners, not because it entailed capitalist exploitation of
the workers. See Foreign Investment. by Nkwenkve Mkomo (Exhibit
BPC C8).
36. "We regard communism, socialism and other related systems as
the results of a white man's frustrations in his capitalism and
therefore just as unacceptable as capitalism that has given
birth to them."*The Repugnant Elements in Western Culture,' (SASO
Rl). See also Kgoti Holetsane's comment in his trial, that while
communalism and communism both favoured sharing, the former also
encouraged self-development and was not against private
enterprise. S v Molokeng, Case 30/76 (TPD) Record p. 1025.
37. See Barney Pityana, * Priorities in Community Development - An
Appeal to the Blackman's compassion', SASO Newsletter, Septmber
1971, p.13.
38. inkululeko Yesizwe (draft) August 1974. (Exhibit General 61).
39. Minutes of the Black People's Convention held at the Lay
Ecumenical Centre, Edendale (Pietermaritzburg) from 8 JUly, 1972
to 10th July, 1972 (BPC Bl) p. 10.
40. Ibid, p. 12.
41. Thus, SASO announced that Black Consciousness "is the
preparatory stage of the people's revolution, a precedence to a
just and humane society" Or, as Biko put it, "Blacks are out to
completely transform the system and make of it what they wish."I
Write what I like, p. 63.
72. in effect/ this seemed very much like a SASO coup, for
Nefolovhodwe was elected SRC President in an election presided
over by his successor as chair of the local SASO branch, Cyril
Ramaphosa. The first policy of the new SRC was to secure the
official reinstatement of SASO on campus. Examination of
Nefolovhodwe. Record 5577-8.
73. Most notable was the opening speech by Ruben Hare, Vice
President of SASO, who had advocated the use of violence. Other
ideas on violence were discussed over the weekend. A discussion
on "The consummation of the Struggle" urged learning the lessons
of Frelimo, and the report noted "If any infiltration is to be
done, we must infiltrate the tsotsis." Transvaal Regional
Formation School Minutes (SASO Ol) p. 131. One commission
reported that "Areas near the border should be conscientized to
identify themselves with freedom fighters - such p[eo]ple should
be 'prepared'• " Ibid p. 137. A discussion on grassroots
involvement similarly realised that a resort to arms was "a
practical necessity," but that the people needed preparation not
to see the guerrillas as terrorists. Ibid p. 142.
74. Exhibit TTT.
75. See Record 3672 ff. This document was cited in the indictment
and became a crucial piece of evidence for the state: it is hence
important to note that it never even reached the stage of being
formally approved by the executive of BPC.
76. The commissions were on 1. Reaching the Masses; 2* Role of
Black Man in Present Day Society; 3. Black Solidarity; 4.
Workers: Cornerstone of Liberation; 5. Worker - Student
Relationship. The advertisement attracted particular attention
from the authorities: "Time has come, time is ripe and time is
NOW for the Blackmail to break the chains and seize the power
which he for centuries has been denied .. • The burning issue of
'THE INEVITABLE LIBERATION BY SEIZURE OF POWER1 is long overdue
therefore there is need to act, NOW or NEVER. ... Every Black-
man, butcher, baker, or candlestick maker who accepts the
challenge should attend to voice his say." Semicon advertisement
(Exhibit BPC Ol) • In the end, hwoever, the semi con was not as
large as it was intended to be. Though a three day semi con with
five commissions had been planned, several key speakers,
including Hassan Howa, Manas Buthelezi and Adam Small were unable
to attend, and the meeting became a two day one, with only one
fully working commission.Examination of Nkomo. Record 8464.
77. At this meeting, Buthelezi asked the question of what the
attitude should be towards those whites who were sympathetic to
the cause of Black liberation. Nkomo replied at first, "how can
you speak to a man who is boxing you at the same time," and then
elaborated on a comment made by someone in the audience that if
you were faced with a box of snakes, it was impossible to select
the poisonous ones from the harmless ones. At this meeting/
someone made the point that all the organisations did was to talk
- when were they going to act? Such questions, came the reply
from Mothopeng, should not be asked at such meetings. This
apparently minor episode became a major bone of contention at the
trial/ as a being an indication of the revolutionary aspirations
of the BPC. See Examination of Nkomo. Record 8575.
78. At the same time, SASO held a staff and executive meeting.
Examination of Nefolovhodve. Record 5589. Examination of Cooper.
Record 3694.
79. Examination of Cooper. Record 3699.
80. The SRC took a decision to hold a rally in a general meeting
of students on the 5 September, some two weeks before
Nefolovhodve told the local SASO branch of the decision to hold
national rallies. Examination of Sedibe: Record 5866; Examination
of Nefolovhodwe Record 5597, Examination of Ledwaba Record 273.
81. Examination of cooper. Record 3700
82. After much waiting, they finally met the Minister of
Information who told them the inevitable news that they were
unable to send anyone. For Nkomo's version of events, see Record
8580 ff.
83. Monday* s edition of Die Vaderland (23 September) therefore
urged Frelimo not to accept any invitation and not to attempt to
meddle in South African affairs.
84. This situation was exacerbated by the large number of white
refugees from Mozambique who were increasingly vocal about their
problems. The tension between these Portuguese and the Black
Consciousness organisations was already high, given a press
statement by SASO issued on 9 September after the white Movement
for a Free Mozambique had organised a rally in Johannesburg.
Myeza's statement had written that the whites there wanted to
fight to preserve slavery and injustice. "The dignity of the
Black man has been restored in Mozambique," he concluded, "and
the White people are turning out to be what they truly are,
violent people."Photograph Rally Al.
85. Myeza called Bokwe Mafuna in Botswana on Monday to see if he
had heard any news. Mafuna was not very encouraging. Transcript,
pp. 19-21.
86. When he spoke to Nat Sarachi of the Rand Daily Mail on the
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87. KoeXemoer was a familiar name to readers of the Daily Neva,
his most recent missive having stated that South Africans should
"take steps to defend our families and our homes from attacks
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for "the police were to decide whether the rally was covered by
the ban at all." Snyman Commission p. 78.
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there had evolved a common language of political protest.
Instead, van der Merwe should have examined what they did,
something he eschewed. Examination of Gurr. Record 8096. Van der
Merwe told the court it was not his brief to study the
organisations, and that he only claimed some of the documents had
revolutionary elements (Cross-examination of van der Merwe.
Record 2322-3). Going through them all would have taken too much
time (Record 2339).
142. As Gurr showed, van der Merwe had cited five SASO documents
which foreshadowed violence, a remarkbly small haul from 480
pages of SASO documentary materials. The references included a
resolution referring to Christ as a freedom fighter, a document
entitled 'Mayibuye1, the Tiro commemoration document, the minutes
of the Transvaal Formation School, and a document stating that
the ballot had never preceded the bullet. The references were in
the following documents: Minutes of the Proceedings of the 4th
General Students' Council of the South African students'
Organisation Resolution 41/73 (SASO Gl p. 304); Manuscript paper
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4000 members. As for the 232 pages of BPC documentation, there
were only eight references to violence, five of which were to be
found in poems. Of the three direct references - a press release
of March 1973 warning of a new Vietnam, a resolution on physical
training, and the Semicon minutes - none were unambiguous. The
documents were Black People's Convention - Press Release;
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Moodley, as Publications Director of SASO, never felt SASO
articles were subversive enough to be in need of a legal
opinion, and why printers like Bramdaw never referred them to the
law.
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pp. 8018-19*
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accomplice/ it wqas held that such evidence could only be relied
on when it was clear and satisfactory in every respect. S v
ffrench-Beytagh 1972 SA (3) 430 (AD) at 446, following R v
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